

Report

**Stock Taking for USAID/Kampala's
Strategic Objective 7 Design Process**

February 2001

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Prepared for:

USAID/Kampala

February 2001

Environmental Policy and Institutional Strengthening Indefinite Quantity Contract (EPIQ)

Partners: International Resources Group, Winrock International, and Harvard Institute for International Development

Subcontractors: PADCO; Management Systems International; and Development Alternatives, Inc.

Collaborating Institutions: Center for Naval Analysis Corporation; Conservation International; KNB Engineering and Applied Sciences, Inc.; Keller-Bliesner Engineering; Resource Management International, Inc.; Tellus Institute; Urban Institute; and World Resources Institute

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1. Introduction

This report is intended to contribute to USAID/Kampala's efforts to combine the Strategic Objectives for Environment and Economic Growth that will result in a new Strategic Objective that will promote an enterprise-based approach to sustainable development in Uganda (the new SO7). The report will focus upon providing an analysis of the constraints to the adoption of improved practices that lead to sustainable development in the Uganda's rural sector. The report will analyze constraints to the adoption of improved practices from an individual, an institutional, and a governance perspective. Other reports will address policy level constraints to the adoption of improved practices that lead to sustainable development.

Once the primary constraints to adoption have been identified, the report will outline the primary actors involved in NRM and how Uganda's current institutional environment contribute to these constraints. Finally, the report will present recommendations concerning how USAID/Kampala can contribute to addressing the major constraints to improved sustainable development.

The report is based upon the authors' observations and discussions in Uganda and field experience elsewhere in Africa. The authors consciously limited themselves in the "Possible Interventions" section of the report to recommendations that are based upon the lessons learned from the practical experience of sustainable development activities within Uganda and throughout Africa. Whenever possible, the report cites the specific activities from which the recommendations were derived.

The report's findings and recommendations have been put forward to help the Mission frame its discussions with its partners during the Mission's strategic planning process.

In short, the authors have proposed hypotheses concerning sustainable development in Uganda based upon continent-wide experiences. It is the authors' expectation that participants in USAID/Kampala's strategic planning process will accept, reject, modify, and ultimately improve these hypotheses based upon their more extensive experience in the Ugandan context.

The findings and recommendations put forward in this report are based upon:

- Interviews in Kampala with major stakeholders from USAID, GOU, international and local NGOs as well as other donors,

- A five-day field trip to southwest Uganda to visit on-going USAID-sponsored activities and extensive interviews with development practitioners and rural producers during that period¹,
- Reading AID/W, USAID/Kampala, GOU, project, and other relevant documents, and
- Lessons learned from similar sustainable development² activities in other African countries.

The analysis of constraints and possible interventions will be organized to reflect three levels of decision-making concerning natural resource use. These three levels of decision-making are important because USAID/Kampala's intervention strategies will vary in response to the unique challenges facing decision-makers at each level. The three levels of decision-making are:

- Private Property/Use Rights
- Private Property/Use Rights in a Highly Interdependent Context
- Protected Area.

Assumptions

This report is based upon certain assumptions that should be made explicit before continuing.

First, the division made by donors such as USAID between natural resource management (NRM) and productive rural activities (agricultural production, livestock, fisheries, forestry, handicrafts production etc.) does not reflect how rural producers view the use of the resources over which they have control (or have use rights). Decision-makers at the local level in the rural sector almost always seek to minimize the risks inherent in living in a low-resource rural economy by managing as wide a variety of activities as possible given the resources (labor, land, capital, technologies, social support networks) available to them. These activities span agriculture, livestock, forestry, fisheries, and income-generating activities and are managed by individuals and social units as an integrated whole.

¹ The authors appreciated the field-level personnel's unfailing courtesy and candor.

² Many of these activities were conducted under the auspices of NRM projects. However, stakeholders responsible for NRM activities came to realize that they could not divorce their activities from rural producers' economic development activities.

The distinctions that donors and other modern institutions create between NRM and productive activities reflect Western tendencies towards specialization and can impede institutions' ability to understand and respond to its primary customers' (rural producers) world-view (decision-making calculus). This report will use the term "rural producer" rather than the more traditional designation "farmer/forester/fisherman" to denote subsistence level stakeholders in the rural sector in order to underscore how individuals who are active in the rural sector manage their resource portfolio as an integrated whole.

Second, rural producers will make rational decisions regarding sustainable development if the enabling conditions are in place to make such decisions. It is incumbent upon rural development institutions (GOU, USAID, NGOs, etc) to develop technical packages, provide access to capital, and create the policy environment that will allow rural producers to act rationally. In short, if rural producers are not acting in the manner anticipated by development practitioners the fault is not in the rural producers but in ourselves³ (with apologies to Shakespeare).

Third, if successful, USAID's interventions will target as many smallholder rural producers as possible to create the enabling conditions that will allow them to move from subsistence level (wherein food security is rural producers' primary objective and is not guaranteed) to a commercial production level. Rural producers will generally move from subsistence production to a commercial status through the following steps⁴:

Rural Producer Status	Behavior/Status Change	Skills Acquisition Required	Resource Acquisition Required
Subsistence	Improved natural resource management practices (arresting/slowing the rate of NR degradation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participatory Analysis • Technical 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical packages • Secure tenure • Improved inputs • Capital
	Improved return on inputs (labor, capital, technologies) leads to improved productivity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical 	
	Increased number of productive activities available to rural producers (diversification)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical 	

³ Julius Caesar, Act 1 Scene 2 Cassius "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, But in ourselves"

⁴ The author found a similar table in the PMA (Chapter 4, Section 7, Table 4.1) which can be used for comparative purposes during the Mission's stakeholder meetings

Commercial	Generation of surplus due to improved productivity, diversification (includes linking rural producers with private sector service providers of products and services), and capturing more of value-added stream at rural producers level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical • Enterprise Management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Same as above and • Legal standing as economic actor • Market information
	Identifying markets for sale of primary and value-added products	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negotiation • Enterprise Management 	
	Linking with outside sources of capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negotiation • Enterprise Management 	
	Selling products and services on open market	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negotiation • Enterprise Management 	

2. Constraints To The Adoption Of Sustainable Development Activities

2.1 Private Property/Use Rights

Primary actors at this level of analysis include:

- Rural Producers
- Rural Producers Associations (Farmer Fora at the five LC levels)
- Research and Extension Services (both government and planned private sector service providers under the National Agricultural Advisory Services)
- NGOs
- Private Sector service providers
- Financial Institutions
- Other donor organizations

This level of analysis focuses on rural producers and the decisions they make concerning management of their immediate natural resource base⁵ in order to produce goods and services. More than three quarters of rural producers in Uganda are either smallholders who own up to 2.2 hectares of land or who rent land for agricultural purposes⁶.

The following are the primary constraints to rural producers adopting practices that promote sustainable development in Uganda.

⁵ This includes exclusive rights (ownership), seasonal access, use rights, and rents.

⁶ Section 3.2 of PMA. The report lost its pagination when it was e-mailed to the U.S.

- Rural producers generally lack a precise understanding concerning the relationship between improved natural resources management practices (or the lack thereof) and improved (or sustainable) productive activities⁷.

Whereas most rural producers can cite examples of how yields from natural resources have decreased over time most rural producers and rural producer groups do not provide ready explanations for why yields have decreased.

⁷ Constraint #8 in “Problem Analysis for SO7 of Joint Report. The constraints presented here are cross-referenced with the “problem tree” presentation format to assist the reader to understand the rationale each presentation style.

“Twenty years ago a boat would bring in a hundred fish, now fifty fish is considered a good catch”

a fisherman on Lake Edward commenting on reduced fish stocks⁸.

It is particularly important to note that rural producers often fail to point out in initial interviews how specific human practices can impact long-term sustainability. There is a tendency among rural producers to ascribe diminished yields from natural resources to forces that are beyond human control. There are two primary reasons for the failure to initially link behaviors on the micro level to consequences on a macro level.

First, most people do not link the consequences of their activities to macro-level problems because people engage in economic and social activities that are in their short-term interests and it is therefore difficult to link activities that are rational (in one’s personal interest to perform) and unavoidable with negative macro level impacts.

Second, there is the natural tendency by rural producers (and all humans) to guard information from outsiders. Results from participatory analytical exercises such as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRAs)⁹ demonstrate that rural producers throughout Africa are more aware of the impact that their actions have upon their surrounding natural resource base than they care to admit in public to strangers. Once a level of trust is established between rural producers and PRA practitioners, the former group will usually develop relatively sophisticated, empirically-based analyses of the long-term impact of human activity upon the natural resource base¹⁰.

- Few management options that promote sustainable development are available to, or are known by, rural producers¹¹.

⁸ A sometimes disheartening consequence of conducting PRAs and reading PRA reports throughout Africa is the ubiquity of statements analogous to the one cited here.

⁹ The report will use “PRA” as a shorthand for the more cumbersome term “participatory analytical processes” even though the PRA process is only one tool among many. “PRA” will be used here because it was used most often by Ugandan practitioners.

¹⁰ Perhaps this idea is best expressed by Robert Chambers throughout his many publications

¹¹ Constraints Nos. 15, 30-33

There has been a general, continent-wide, failure by national and international research and extension institutions to develop new technologies and practices that are appropriate for low-resource, risk-averse, rural producers. This point is best illustrated by the speed with which new technologies and practices are adopted by rural producers when these technologies and practices meet rural producers' needs.

The AFRENA/Africare/International Heifer Project (IHP) partnership in Kabale District helps illustrate this point in Uganda. The partnership has developed recommendations for the insertion of agro-forestry species (*Calliandra calothyrsus*,) new cropping systems (Climbing beans) and new animal husbandry systems (zero-grazing using cut and carry fodder from *Calliandra* etc.) for the Kigezi Highlands agro-ecological system that improves soil fertility, improves infiltration rates, and reduces soil erosion. As a result, on-farm productivity is improved in both the short- and the long-term.

The practices also have multiple benefit streams for rural producers and help reduce their overall risk while increasing possible income streams. Interviews with project staff and local rural producers indicates that there has been a spread effect in the Kabale District as witnessed by an extensive adoption of the innovative practices by rural producers who are not associated with funded projects.

Examples from elsewhere in Africa include the wide-spread adoption of a wide variety of low-investment, low-technology soil conservation practices in the Sahel. The zai hole/ tassa practice involves introducing organic matter into micro-catchments where field crops such as sorghum and millet will be planted. The labor-intensive practice often results in verified yield increases of 50-300%¹², increased drought resistance, long-term soil improvements, and rehabilitation of abandoned fields. In Mali, combining zai hole technology with the use of inorganic fertilizers increased plant response to nitrogen 100%.

- There is limited capital available to rural producers for adoption of improved practices¹³.

Financial institutions in Uganda do not provide capital to most rural producers. The lack of capital which limits rural producers' ability to move from subsistence production to a

¹² Wild et al. "Review of Lessons Learned in Natural Resource Management in Niger: Factors which influence NRM adoption at the village level," 1996, p.24.

¹³ Constraint #34

commercial level of activity¹⁴. There are several reasons (lower level constraints) why the formal financial sector does not provide capital for smallholder rural producers:

- Most loans are too small to cover financial institutions' overhead costs of maintaining branch offices and of administering small-scale loans¹⁵. It is a truism that small loans require the same labor to administer as most large loans.
- Financial institutions lack confidence in rural producers as business managers and doubt their ability to repay their loans in a timely manner which make them bad credit risks¹⁶.
- Linked to the above constraint is tendency of African governments to become involved in rural credit schemes. Once involved, governments tend to make lending decisions based upon criteria "other than sound financial management dictates." In addition, governments have had a long history of forgiving rural debt for political purposes¹⁷.
- There also appear to be few examples of successful credit union activity in Uganda to which practitioners can point as examples of the transformative power of well-managed micro-investments in the rural sector¹⁸.

The lack of capital in the rural sector limits the private sector's ability to penetrate the rural sector since rural producers' effective demand is based upon their ability to produce surplus production on an annual basis.

Many rural producers do have access to land or work under insecure land tenure systems¹⁹.

- Rural producers have limited knowledge of marketing their products²⁰.

¹⁴ Constraint #16

¹⁵ The PMA points out that Uganda is one of Africa's most "under-banked" countries (Chapter 7, Section 5).

¹⁶ Constraint #38

¹⁷ Constraint #??

¹⁸ Constraints Nos. 24, 25

¹⁹ Constraint #12

²⁰ Constraints Nos. 2, 17, 40,

- Lack of physical infrastructure isolates rural producers from markets and substantially increases the cost of production.²¹

These two constraints impact rural producers once they have produced their goods for market. The team encountered numerous examples of rural producers facing market glut and being unable to even off-load their products. In addition, there seemed to be few attempts at transforming agricultural products to delay bringing products to market or gaining added value from the product. In short, the areas visited by the team face a marketing problem as often as they face a production problem.

2.2 Private Property/Use Rights in a Highly Interdependent Context

Primary actors at this level of analysis include:

- Rural Producers
- Rural Producers Associations (Farmer Fora at various LC levels)
- Research and Extension Services (both government and planned private sector service providers under NAADS)
- Local Councils 1 through 5
- NGOs
- Private Sector service providers
- Financial Institutions
- Other donor organizations

The constraints that prevent rural producers who have private/exclusive use rights across a shared landscape (watershed, wetlands, lake) from adopting improved sustainable development practices are the same as for “Private Property/Use Rights” (listed above) but there is an extra layer of complexity involved because of the often unintended “upstream and downstream” impact of ostensibly independently acting rural producers’ actions upon the livelihoods of other independent rural producers who share the landscape in question.

²¹ Constraint #41

- **No clear institutional mandate exists to assist in resolving “landscape-based” issues²².**

As with most other institutional environments, Uganda’s ministries and evolving Local Council (LC) systems have difficulty resolving landscape-based resource management issues. The primary reasons for these difficulties include:

- Line ministries have difficulty managing cross-cutting problems that reach beyond their technical purview (“is soil erosion a Ministry of Agriculture or a Ministry of Water problem?”).
- Ministries lack the resources and the training to engage in conflict resolution exercises in collaboration with resource users²³.
- Landscape-based issues seldom remain within LC district boundaries.
- The nascent LC system has little experience and few precedents from which to draw examples for successful interventions²⁴.
- **Rural Producer groups lack the analytical, organizational management, and technical skills to understand and address landscape-based issues²⁵**

As stated above in the first section, rural producers often lack a precise understanding how their actions are contributing to loss of productivity and the degradation of their immediate natural resource base. It stands to reason that they will have greater difficulty understanding how their actions will impact other rural producers “upstream” or “downstream” within a shared landscape.

Since analysis is even more difficult in a landscape setting, the management skills required to address and resolve landscape issues are equally hard to master for rural producer groups if they lack outside support.

²² Constraint #14

²³ Constraints Nos. 11, 21

²⁴ Constraints Nos. 24, 25

²⁵ Constraints Nos. 22, 23, 27, 30, 31

2.3 Protected Areas

Primary Actors in Protected Areas Management include:

- Rural Producers in areas surrounding Protected Areas
- Rural Producers Associations (Farmer Fora at various LC levels)
- Technical Line Ministries (with primary emphasis given to the Uganda Wildlife Authority [UWA], the National Environment Management Authority [NEMA], the nascent Forest Authority, Fisheries)
- Research and Extension Services (both government and planned private sector service providers under NAADS)
- Local Councils 1 through 5
- NGOs (especially existing conservation-based international NGOS)
- CBOs (especially the various levels of the Park Action Committees)
- Private Sector service providers
- Financial Institutions
- Other donor organizations

The protected areas include both the national parks (which represent 15% of Uganda's land mass and around which most current SO2 activities are taking place) and the forest reserves (of which the Forest Authority has included 72 in its current database²⁶). Both types of protected areas are controlled and owned by the GOU and almost all economic activity that takes place within these areas benefit stakeholders other than neighboring rural producers and Local Councils.

- **Protected Areas' and rural producers economic interests are often inimical²⁷.**

²⁶ The team was not able to ascertain if the reserves in question had been visited to determine how many of them still existed.

²⁷ Constraints Nos. 8, 19, 20, 21

This constraint has been consistently identified as the major stumbling block to successful protected area management worldwide. The reasons why protected area and neighboring rural producers' economic interests are juxtaposed include:

- Rural producers were often removed from their areas of primary economic activity by central governments in order to create the protected area.
- Rural producers are banned from deriving economic benefit from, or even entering, protected areas.
- Protected area staff often enforce laws capriciously and often extract informal taxes from the local population.
- Protected animal species attack rural producers' crops for which no recompense is available.
- Rural producers see protected areas being exploited by other people.

From interviews with rural producers in areas surrounding various protected areas, it appears to be particularly galling for them to have conservation groups "sensitize" rural producers about the global benefits of species preservation and bio-diversity in order to stop rural producers from engaging in activities that threaten the protected area.

"I know that we are supposed to love our friends the monkeys..."

one informant drawled as he explained that he and his neighbors had no functioning mechanism by which to seek redress for crop damage caused by protected area-dwelling species.

"...but when my neighbor's goats get into my field we have a way to get paid back for the damage – why not with the park? UWA has promised us money since 1994 but we have seen nothing"

- **The mission of Protected Areas Ministries and rural producers' economic interests are often contrary²⁸.**
- **The GOU lacks the resources to project its power²⁹ in the Protected Areas³⁰.**

²⁸ Constraint #10

The on-going debate concerning protected area staffs' role as police, partner, or as both resonates throughout Uganda and elsewhere in Africa. The following paraphrases the same conversation team members had on at least ten different occasions with ten different GOU officials from four different ministries:

- “We don’t have the people and the resources we need to protect [the natural resource in question]. Over the last twenty years we have seen [the resource] reduced by [x] amount. That isn’t sustainable”
- “We are now obliged to collaborate with villagers to manage [the resource]”
- “But we can’t do that because they are going to ruin [the resource] once we let them in”

“We have to preserve the forest by giving people benefits as well as responsibility...

...but I feel that I have to stand between the villagers and the trees.”

Comments by the same GOU official in the space of two minutes.

The profound conundrum confronting GOU officials and their brethren throughout the continent has its roots in the paradigm upon which most Ministries’ missions are based.

- Ministries are charged with protecting the country’s natural resources from the predatory practices of its citizens. Otherwise said, citizens are environmental bandits.

Until recently, rural producers could be arrested from up to five miles outside a national park if they are seen to be walking towards the park with “intent”

- If the ministries do not police the resources, anarchy will rule.
- Under anarchy wide-spread devastation of all natural resource (as described in Hardin’s tragedy of the commons) will ensue.

²⁹ “power” is defined here as “the ability to cause others to act in ways they would not otherwise *at an acceptable cost*.”

³⁰ Constraint #9

Given this paradigm, participatory approaches to natural resource management such as co-management forest plans or the Community Park Action Committee Plans can be seen by GOU officials as little more than an abdication of their responsibility. In the absence of positive examples of in-country co-management schemes, it is hard to convince proponents of the policing approach that participatory management can be successful.

- Revenue streams from protected area do not remain in local jurisdictions³¹.

The team examined various revenue-sharing schemes in Uganda that ranged from reimbursement schemes for rural producers in areas adjacent to national parks to the collaborative management of forest reserves. In most instances, a high percentage of the revenue streams from the protected areas flowed to the central government and were lost to individuals and groups who are directly concerned with the protected area. As a result, rural producers and LC interest in the sustained maintenance of the protected areas resource base is lessened. In other instances, revenues promised to rural producers had not yet arrived which engendered no small degree of rural producer cynicism.

- **Many of the on-going and the planned “participatory planning” activities might not be as participatory as required to engender rural producers’ empowerment³².**

Though the team did not have the opportunity to conduct in-depth reviews of on-going and upcoming participatory planning documents and processes – discussions with various stakeholders indicated that many of the PRA processes were more formulaic than empowering for rural producers. The following section discusses why this constraint is fundamental to a sustainable transformation to sustainable development in Uganda

2.4 A Summary of the Constraints Listed Above

2.4.1 Private Property/Use Rights

- Rural producers generally lack a precise understanding concerning the relationship between improved natural resources management practices (or the lack thereof) and improved (or sustainable) productive activities
- Few management options that promote sustainable development are available to, or are known by, rural producers

³¹ Constraint #2, 8, 11

³² Constraint # 8, 22, 23, 27,

- There is limited capital available to rural producers for adoption of improved practices.
 - o Most loans are too small to cover financial institutions' overhead costs of maintaining branch offices and of administering small-scale loans. It is a truism that small loans require the same labor to administer as most large loans.
 - o Financial institutions lack confidence in rural producers as business managers and doubt their ability to repay their loans in a timely manner which make them credit risks.
 - o Linked to the above constraint is tendency of African governments to become involved in rural credit schemes. Once involved, governments make tend to make lending decisions based upon criteria "other than sound financial management dictates." In addition, governments have had a long history of forgiving rural debt for political purposes.
 - o There also appear to be few examples of successful credit union activity in Uganda to which practitioners can point as examples of the transformative power of well-managed micro-investments in the rural sector.
 - o Many rural producers do have access to land or work under insecure land tenure systems
- Rural producers have limited knowledge of marketing their products.
- Lack of physical infrastructure isolates rural producers from markets and substantially increases the cost of production

2.4.2 Private Property/Use Rights in a Highly Interdependent Context

- No clear institutional mandate exists to assist in resolving "landscape-based" issues
- Rural Producer groups lack analytical, organizational management, and technical skills to understand and address landscape-based issues

2.4.3 Protected Area

- Protected Areas' and rural producers economic interests are often inimical
- The mission of Protected Areas Ministries and rural producers economic interests are often contrary.

- The GOU lacks the resources to project its power into the Protected Areas
- Revenue streams from protected area do not remain in local jurisdictions
- Many of the on-going and the planned “participatory planning” activities might not be as participatory as required to engender rural producers’ empowerment

3. Possible Interventions

As stated in the introduction, the suggested interventions listed below were formulated in response to the constraints analysis. The recommendations are all based upon an analysis of the practical experience of development activities in Uganda and in other African countries. The interventions are proposed to help engender further discussion and analysis by USAID/Kampala partners.

The first section below discusses issues that are not limited to any one of the three levels of decision-making outlined in the constraints analysis. Sections II through IV then propose interventions that could be supported by the Mission that are formulated to respond to the constraints identified above.

3.1 General Overview

3.1.1 Participation as a fundamental condition for achieving SO7

Many of the constraints identified above can only be overcome if rural producers:

- Find it in their interest to become responsible stewards of the country's natural resource base, and
- Develop the skills required to be responsible stewards of the country's natural resource base by acting as efficient and empowered economic actors in a commercially-based sustainable rural economic sector.

The most efficient means by which USAID/Kampala can achieve its SO7 may be to promote participatory development processes whenever possible. Simply stated, activities that use participatory processes end up being both entrepreneurial and empowering³³.

Participatory Activities are Entrepreneurial: because they effectively identify and meet their customers' needs. Activities using participatory approaches ensure that the activity is, and is perceived by its rural producers, to be:

- Relevant,

³³ Paraphrased from Impact Assessment of Ag/NRM Strategic Objective of USAID/Senegal (Old SO2) Volume 2, pp. 206-07 (EPIQ Task Order No. 825, 1999)

- Feasible,
- Appropriate, and
- In rural producers' real, and felt, short, medium, and long term interest because rural producers control the design process.

Participatory Activities are Empowering: because rural producers are required to perform and master the following tasks (usually in collaboration with facilitation teams at first):

- Analyze their current situation to develop an awareness of the causes and consequences of the current environmental situation,
- Examine possible solutions to problems identified by the rural producers,
- Develop strategies for implementing solutions to identified problems that are technically appropriate, financially replicable, and socially acceptable,
- Develop the skills and confidence necessary to manage a wide variety of activities designed to resolve identified problems,
- Organize themselves when necessary in order to represent rural producers' interests and mobilize resources when interacting with other actors (government, NGOs, financial institutions, other rural producer groups),
- Complete the process necessary to achieve legal standing for their group (when the cost and process is not prohibitive)
- Develop and manage contracts including tendering documents that have legal standing,
- Implement activities they have designed with technical assistance from outside agencies,
- Replicate the development cycle and continue the development process beyond the life and purview of outside interveners.

The table below presents an operational definition of participation (ODP) that is both optimally entrepreneurial and optimally empowering. The table reflects the major tasks performed by stakeholders during a typical project cycle.

The ODP table has been adapted from responsibility matrices that are used by management consultants to determine where decision-making power for, influence over, and appreciation of,

specific tasks is found within formal organizations (private and public sector). Responsibility matrices provide interested parties with a snap shot of where actual decision-making power is found within an organization.

This ODP table has been adapted from similar tables used by the author to help clarify major stakeholders' roles and responsibilities in participatory projects in Niger and Senegal. The first ODP table was developed at a regional conference in Niger by participants who ranged from rural producers to national level government officials. Subsequent iterations were developed by the author while examining participatory projects in Senegal and Niger.

Major actors in the development process in Uganda are listed horizontally. There are five levels (or gradations thereof) to characterize specific stakeholder (individuals and groups) involvement in (or responsibility for) a specific task in the project cycle. The terms used to denote the differing levels of involvement have the same meaning as used in everyday language with the exception of "Appreciate." "Appreciate" indicates that the stakeholder has the right to be kept aware of how a task is proceeding but can neither influence nor control its outcome.

If two stakeholders share "Decision-making control" then they are required to collaborate before decision can be acted upon. In case of conflict, the stakeholder who is higher in the hierarchy will prevail though at a high cost to that stakeholder.

The ODP creates a detailed vision of the level of responsibility required in order for rural producers to become empowered participants in the development process. This vision is based upon the author's operational experience in Niger, but more importantly, upon the experiences of a cadre of similar projects throughout the Sahel in which rural producers assumed full responsibility for long-term land use planning and for all the activities required to implement the plans.

Development practitioners may be surprised to see Rural Producer Groups having "D" entered opposite tasks such as "Developing Tendering Documents" and "Selection of Service Provider." After receiving rigorous training in participatory analyses and enterprise management, rural producer groups in Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal, Niger, Botswana, and Namibia (to cite examples where the authors have personal experience) successfully develop and manage contractual relationships with service providers and with financial institutions.

Decision-making power must rest as much as possible with rural producers since they are the primary clients to whom USAID/Kampala must respond if the Mission is to effect planned change under SO7. The Model ODP shows a preponderance of "Decision making control" resting with the rural promoter and "Influence" and "Appreciation" being reserved for NGOs, LC officials and technical ministries at the local and national levels. The body of evidence from participatory rural development projects worldwide has proven that rural producers can fulfill the role described for

them in the ODP and that the resulting planning and activities are more multi-layered, appropriate, and innovative than could be developed by outside experts.

A review of the table shows that effective development practitioners at the field level (NGOs, CBOs, LC, and government technical services) are not passive. The preponderance of “Influence” and the occasional shared “I/D” ranking illustrate that it is incumbent upon field level staff to fulfill their role as change agents in order to encourage rural producers to analyze new approaches and technologies.

On a positive note, it is incumbent upon field level staff to determine where other projects and programs have developed promising activities which deserve to be replicated. Thus, projects such as ILM, CARE, COBS, and AFRENA/Africare/IHP described above should be analyzed and promoted by project staff to stakeholders as an example of what is possible in the rural development sector.

On a more negative note, it is incumbent upon field staff to prevent rural producers from undertaking activities which the staff know to be counter-productive. Thus, for example technical staff can not, in the name of using a participatory approach, allow rural producers to plant a specific tree species which are inappropriate for (or will yield results counter to) the objective for which it is planted³⁴. Once again, participatory projects seek simply to redress the imbalance which occurs in top-down projects in which rural producers had no say whatsoever in project planning and implementation—they do not seek to nullify the role of experts.

Each stakeholder group has experience, expertise, and a perspective which it must bring to the development process. Rural producers are local experts who have extensive knowledge of the local milieu and mores. Change agents (NGO/CBO representatives, government officials) have access to information and innovations on a region-wide basis and they are responsible for bringing new information and innovations to the attention of rural producers. It is incumbent upon change agents to present innovations in such a way that rural producers can use their newly improved analytical skills to determine the appropriateness of such information and innovations for their needs.

The following scenario drawn from the table illustrates how the reader can interpret the ODP table.

A USAID-financed rural development activity purports to use a participatory process to promote sustainable development within a single parish (the author chooses this example because he is under the impression that no such project currently exists in Uganda). A team has been charged

³⁴ The author witnessed this behavior by field-level technicians in Senegal who allowed inappropriate trees species to be planted because they felt that their role precluded any intervention on their part.

with reviewing on-going operations to determine if participatory processes are being used and what their impact might be. The team can use the ODP matrix to organize their observations and to characterize these activities in comparison to a “model” participatory activity. Once completed, the team can compare the project’s ODP to the model and begin to measure where the project’s divergence from the model has, and has not had, an impact upon the project’s effectiveness.

For example, under “Analysis of Current Situation” – if the rural producer group brings out various PRA tools (trend analyses, rural producer-generated maps, etc.) and demonstrate how they arrived at various conclusions about their current situation, then the team can conclude that the group had decision-making control (D) over that task.

If, however, the rural producer groups indicate that they engaged in problem identification but that their partner NGO indicated that they had a pre-determined plan of action for the area, then the team would enter “A” Under “Rural Producer Group”/Analysis and Selection of Mitigating Actions.” The team would then start to entertain questions as to whether the project’s processes empowered rural producers which is a necessary precondition for approaching SO7.

The scenario described here is noteworthy because it is common with putative participatory projects. Too often, projects designed to promote sustainable development use financial (or in-kind) incentives to induce behavioral changes in rural producers. Such incentives usually produce impressive short-term behavioral changes but undermine the activity’s (and the Mission’s) strategic objectives by obscuring, in, the minds of rural producers, the reasons for changing their behaviors.

Stated otherwise, projects that use incentives to change behaviors are suspending reality for rural producers rather than working with rural producers to develop strategies for changing their reality. USAID can use tools such as the ODP to determine whether activities it finances are participatory (therefore entrepreneurial and empowering) and take corrective action if they are not.

Participatory Activities as a means to Promote SO9 (Democracy & Governance):

<p>The PASP is our political party</p> <p>A Nigerian rural producer referring to the participatory project that provided the producer with the skills and confidence necessary to identify and resolve a wide variety of rural development problems</p>

To quote former Speaker of the House “Tip” O’Neill “all politics is local.” The political process is primarily concerned with the distribution of resources within and between various communities. The legitimacy of a polity is generally determined by its transparency and by system’s adherence to agreed processes for resources allocation (few systems acknowledge in writing that they are rapacious or feudal in nature). Most rural producers in Africa have learned that the political process is controlled by powerful members of each society and that it is in their interest to minimize their exposure to the political process since they run the risk of having their resource transferred elsewhere if they are exposed to an arena in which they have no power.

Evidence from participatory planning and development projects throughout Africa (and worldwide) indicates that rural producer associated with such projects use the skills they have acquired (analytical, negotiation, management) to become more active members of civil society. Members of rural producer groups that have coalesced to resolve a specific problem and who have benefited from PRA-type training become strong proponents of good governance at the local level.³⁵

Previously disenfranchised rural producer groups in countries from Mali to Namibia have used their newly acquired skills and new sense of empowerment for the benefit of their communities and to hold local officials accountable for their activities within an area.

The author had the bittersweet experience in Niger of incurring the wrath of just such newly empowered project beneficiaries. Representatives from the Village Management Committee visited the project’s office to pound on his desk and berated him for ten minutes because they had been visited by a contractor who had told them (falsely) that they were no longer responsible for the tendering process they had been managing for a wells construction activity. They were willing to end their relationship with the project if they could not retain their project management prerogatives.

After the contractor’s rumor was shown to be false, the group members admitted with slightly stunned expressions that it was the first time they had ever protested to protect their rights.

Lessons learned analyses in Niger and Senegal shows that the general composition of local level management committees change during the course of participatory projects. These management

³⁵ Gueye, p. 18.

committees initially are populated with the “usual suspects” (village chiefs, religious leaders, noble castes, etc.) because the positions are perceived to give committee members first access to project resources (as per most such projects).

When the positions fail to provide financial benefits committee membership devolves to younger men and to women who tended to be more interested in using development activities to benefit a wider spectrum of community members. In Senegal, for example, members of local and regional project management committees have been elected to the equivalent of LC1, LC3, and LC5 positions based on the strength of their superior management skills and despite their relatively low social status.³⁶ In Niger, rural producers listed “PRA meetings” as the third most important benefit to accrue from a highly productive rural development project that used participatory processes.

³⁶ Lichte, p. 172

Operational Definition of Participation

- D - Decision-making control,
- I - Influence over decision,
- A - Appreciation

Major Project/Program Tasks	Rural Producer Groups	NGO ³⁷	Local Council	Local Technical Ministries	National Technical Ministries
1.Planning					
Analysis of Current Situation	D	I	I	I	A
Trend Analysis	D	I	I	I	A
Problem Identification	D	I	I	I	A
Problem Analysis	D	I	I	I	A
Analysis and Selection of Mitigating Actions (prioritizing actions)	D	I	I/D	I/D	I/A
Action Plan Creation (includes budgeting)	D	I/D	I/D	I	I
Developing Tendering Documents	D	I/D	I	I/A	I
Proposal Submission	A	I	D	D	A
Selection of Service Provider (negotiating contracts)	D	D/I	D/I	I	A
2. Implementation					
Labor	D	I	I	I	A
Provision of Technical Assistance	D	I	I/D	I/D	A
Monitoring Project Activities (including budget management)	D	I/D	I/D	I	A
3. Other Activities					
Training	D	I	I	I/D	A
Environmental Monitoring	D	I	I/D	D	D
Monitoring Long-term impact	D	I	I/D	I/D	I

3.1.2 Incorporating Rural Producers' Perspective into the Mission's Design Process

This report's first assumption is that institutions are too sectoral in their approach to rural development. USAID/Kampala might be a more effective advocate for Uganda's smallholder rural producers if it were to develop activities and interventions that reflect, and respond to, rural

³⁷ Or designated change agent such as local CBO or, in the best of all circumstances, the LC or local technical ministry.

producers' integrated management perspective. Thus, for example, all activities and interventions could be analyzed (and promoted if deemed appropriate) in terms of whether:

- Activities will increase or decrease rural producers risk exposure,
- Activity benefits respond to rural producers' needs, and
- Activity benefits will be realized in an acceptable time frame for rural producers.

3.1.3 The Role of Risk

USAID/Kampala could evaluate proposed activities and programs that increase rural producers risk with the same degree of trepidation as do rural producers. This approach could be especially important given the fundamental shifts in GOU policy being enacted under the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). Under its auspices, the Program for the Modernization of Agriculture (PMA), promotes transformation of the agricultural sector through moving the majority of the rural population from subsistence agriculture to commercial activities through a wide array of strategies.

The statement above should not be construed as a criticism of the PMA planning process to date. On the contrary, the PMA provides an excellent analysis of the causes and consequences of poverty from both a macro perspective and the rural producers' perspective (Chapter 2, Section 2). The PMA calls for a multi-sectoral approach to development that accounts for rural producers' ability to accept and manage risk.

The PMA stresses in its vision statement that its policies will:

- Increase rural producers' productive capacity; and
- Transform the wider "agricultural and agro-industrial sector" to help absorb Uganda's growing labor pool and capture more value-added activities within Uganda;

all without increasing rural producers' exposure to risk (Section 4.2).

However, past experience with agricultural modernization programs in Africa indicates that most such programs end up focusing on maximizing production without accounting for the disincentive that increased risk poses for low-resource rural producers nor for the negative impact that increased production can have upon the natural resource base. The example of ranching schemes throughout the Sahel and of export mono-cropping in Senegal's Peanut Basin are but two examples among many.

In each instance, the development community imposed high-risk, high-input, sector-based interventions upon rural producers. In each instance rural producers were placed in the position of being the objective of policy decisions. In each instance, the policies failed and rural producers and their natural resource base are poorer for it.

USAID/Kampala could monitor the PMA's program initiatives to determine if rural producers' risk exposure will be too high. If the PMA and its programs tend towards increasing rural producers' risk, the Mission can act as the rural producers' advocate and lobby for programs that incorporate risk as a (or the) primary decision-making criteria.

3.1.4 Responding to Rural Producers' Needs

Most rural producers understand concepts such as conservation and natural resource management. They do not find "sensitization" campaigns to be very compelling nor are they motivated to adopt practices that promote these macro-level goals unless they directly contribute to their own livelihood in the short and the long term.

All development activities can be analyzed in terms of their economic impact upon rural producers. If such activities increase production, spread or reduce risk, or generate by-products for other income-generating activities (such as enterprise management or literacy/numeracy training) then they can be promoted. The quote below provides an excellent example of understanding rural producer needs and "pitching the product" accordingly.

"Each tree you planted there will be worth 20,000 shillings in a few years.
Twenty thousand, twenty thousand, twenty thousand, twenty thousand...
(repeated again and again)"

AFRENA researcher to rural producer as the researcher pointed to trees the rural producer had planted in his terrace.

3.1.5 Adopting Rural Producers' Time Horizons

This is a corollary of the second point made above. Development planners can also benefit from analyzing and planning activities and programs in terms of the time frame in which benefits from these activities are realized by rural producers. Based upon successes to date, USAID/Kampala could continue to promote activities and programs that provide a mix of short-term (by the next harvest) and longer-term economic benefits to rural producers in order to make such activities and programs acceptable to rural producers.

By calling for a mix of short-term and long-term benefit packages, the author is not saying that rural producers are not capable of planning for the long-term. Most rural producers are too busy meeting their short-term needs to concern themselves with longer term plans and benefit streams. If activities can provide short-term benefits then rural producers will be in a better position to address and resolve longer-term problems.

“Here, the Minister of the Interior rules”

Oft-quoted joke by rural producers in Francophone West Africa when asked why they seem uninterested in natural resource management activities that are promoted without accompanying income-generating activities.

Two examples from Uganda are useful here. The CARE/Queen Elizabeth Community Conservation project introduced improved fish drying ovens to rural producers in Kisenyi which helped reduce their fuel costs by 60%. At the same time, the project introduced village woodlots and other longer-term activities to the rural producer groups.

The AFRENA/Africare/IHP partnership combined the introduction of climbing beans, vegetable production, and rabbit production (short-term benefits) with terrace protection and zero-grazing schemes. The “quick victory” of the former set of interventions improved short-term economic prospects for rural producers and increased their confidence in their development partners. As such, they are pre-disposed towards adopting practices in which benefits will only accrue over a longer-period of time.

3.1.6 Relationship of Current Activities to SO7

From a strategic perspective, it appears that USAID/Kampala’s on-going and planned SO1 activities and expertise will be leveraged most often and most completely at the first level of decision-making. This is because SO1 activities focus on promoting activities that increase outputs (agricultural production, yields from fishing, transformation of agricultural products, etc.) and which focus at the rural producer level.

By contrast, it appears that USAID/Kampala’s on-going SO2 activities and expertise will be brought to bear when developing strategies at the Private Property/Use Rights in a Highly Interdependent Context and Protected Area levels of decision-making.

3.2 Private Property/Use Rights

The primary actors at this level are the rural producers themselves, local level rural producer federations, research and extension services, NGOs and CBOs, and private sector service providers (including financial institutions).

The overall goal of USAID interventions could be to:

- Help local and international research institutions develop the capacity to develop agro-ecological zone-specific RP-appropriate practices and technologies that promote sustainable development,
- Provide access to the resources (especially capital) that will allow rural producers to adopt and benefit from improved sustainable development practices, and
- Provide rural producer groups with the analytical, negotiation, technical, and enterprise management skills necessary to move from a subsistence level of production to a commercial level (as stated above and will not be repeated here).

USAID's interventions at this level include efforts to:

- **Enhance Farming Systems Research and Extension (FSR/E) capacity within NARO with support from appropriate CGIAR institutions.**

Since the PMA emphasizes the need for customer-driven agricultural research and extension systems, the Mission could capitalize upon the excellent work done in southwestern Uganda to influence the implementation plans for the rest of the NARO system . The AFRENA/Africare/IHP functional partnership provides a positive FSR/E model worthy of emulation throughout Uganda. Not only has the partnership researched a variety of rural producer-appropriate packages that have led to wide-spread adoption in its agro-ecological zone, but it continues to research crops and integrated systems that will increase the number of productive choice available to rural producers.

For example, if AFRENA's research activities are successful, a variety of fruit trees normally associated with temperate climates (apple, peach, plum, etc.) will be added to rural producers' portfolio of possible economic activities. These readily marketed crops will improve local rural producers' income flows with minimal initial capital outlay and with minimal risk.

The AFRENA/Africare/IHP example is by no means unique in Africa and merely provides another example of how even the most resource-poor rural producers will adopt innovative

practices if they meet rural producers' needs. Recommended practices are most often adopted by rural producers when they are:

- Low-risk,
- Require little additional management,
- Low-cost (in terms of finance, labor, and opportunity costs),
- Based upon existing practices with which rural producers are familiar, and
- Able to be implemented incrementally.

Given Uganda's high productive potential that has often led to farmers flooding markets with minimal absorptive capacity, Uganda's FSR/E capacity must include a highly developed capacity to identify the absorptive capacity of local, national, regional, and international markets. USAID/Kampala could explore how to leverage AFRENA's decision to engage a regional marketing expert.

- **Develop local institutions' capacity to engage rural producers in participatory analytical processes.**

Local institutions by and large do not have the skills, experience, and confidence in rural producers necessary to facilitate PRA processes. Local level technical agents, LC representatives, NGOs, and CBOs will require training in PRA processes for two primary reasons. First, they will acquire the skills necessary to facilitate the process.

Second, and more importantly, they will usually acquire greater respect for the PRA's potential and for rural producers' ability to act as equal partners in the development process. For example, summary reports from the PRA network in Mali stated that government officials fundamentally changed their perspective concerning rural producers' analytical abilities and commitment to sustainable NRM. As a result of participating in the PRA process, government officials were willing to engage in co-management activities with rural producers which later proved to be successful³⁸.

The use of PRA training and experience to increase confidence between rural producers and government officials can help to address the latter groups' fear of agreeing to co-management of

³⁸ Gueye, M. Bara Programme de renforcement des capacités dans l'utilisation de la MARP au Sahel. IIED, 1997.

Protected Areas. The author's personal experience from Niger and Senegal indicates that formally educated development practitioners who participated in PRAs were impressed by rural producers' knowledge and analytical ability. Forestry officials in Niger regularly ceded informal forest management rights to rural producer groups as part of PRA-driven projects. In Senegal, rural producers were given unofficial auxiliary forester status once rural producers were inspired to protect natural regeneration in their fields as a result of participatory problem analysis.³⁹

The use of participatory analysis can be particularly important when considering how to "scale-up" programs that promote sustainable development practices. Most activities such as USAID activities have local and restricted impact on rural producers' behavior. Few activities achieve the anticipated spread effect that is needed to have a systemic impact on the rural sector. If USAID focuses on promoting the capacity of local institutions to use tools such as the PRA then the benefits accruing from this approach can be more easily spread over a wider area as officials (LC and technical) engage more rural producers in the analytical processes.

- **Improve and increase technical training for Rural Producers.**

Based on lessons learned from throughout Africa, technical training programs for rural producers should focus on:

- Rural producer to rural producer visits to where new technologies have been successfully adopted "on-farm." If early adopters are used for peer to peer visits, they should be compensated for sharing their trade secrets with potential competitors,
- Applications-based, hands-on training sessions that are grounded in adult education principles (with particular emphasis being given to develop training materials that target pre-literate rural producers). The author's experience has been that most training for rural producers replicates the academic classroom-based approach to instruction that is at best ineffective,
- A "menu" of practices and technologies from which rural producers can pick and choose based on their resource base (amount of labor, land, capital, technical know how, risk profile),
- Packages that allow rural producers to experiment on a small scale before scaling up (rural producer level scientific method), and

³⁹ Samde Seydou, Kogoneye, Mari, Dorobobo, Dobo-Dobo Projects in Niger. Jig-jam in Senegal.

- “Sales pitches” that respond to rural producers’ risk profile and acceptable time horizon before they receive a return on their investments (usually one growing season).
- Increase rural producers’ access to capital (links to financial institutions; creation of credit unions) that is linked to rigorous enterprise management training.
- Streamline the process by which rural producer groups can achieve legal standing.

Based on lessons learned throughout Africa, rigorous enterprise management training is required to ensure that the infusion of capital into the rural sector has a positive rather than a deleterious impact on development activities. The success of CLUSA and PACT projects amongst others demonstrate that rural producers can move successfully from subsistence to commercial production levels with short-term technical external assistance.

3.3 Private Property/Use Rights In A Highly Interdependent Context

In addition to the interventions described above in “Private/Exclusive Use” USAID/Kampala interventions at this level include efforts to:

- Support on-going “landscape based” activities such as AFRENA’s Kyantobi watershed management initiative, ILM’s activities, the Wetlands Programme, and pilot projects identified through the COBS-supported District Environmental Action Plan (DEAP) processes.

One of USAID/Kampala’s comparative advantages is its relative flexibility at the operational level. USAID can capitalize upon its on-going research (AFRENA), development (Africare) and planning activities (COBS) to help select pilot “landscape-based” projects in southwestern Uganda where highly interdependent rural producers are ready to plan and implement sustainable development activities in collaboration with LCs and USAID-financed entities.

These activities:

- Combine the promotion of individual (rural producer) and communal (landscape) interests, and
- Provide support for the implementation of environmental action planning activities
- in a series of discrete activities.

The first point above is important because Uganda’s increasingly high population density will increase the incidence of conflict over interdependent natural resources. The country will benefit

from practical successful examples of collaborative resource management in the productive arena.

The second point is important because of the need to connect resources that support implementation activities to the on-going and extensive planning processes that are being undertaken under USAID/Kampala's auspices. Field-level informants throughout the team's trip in southwestern Uganda and during the stocking taking workshop in Kampala expressed the concern that participants in the planning processes would become discouraged if their plans did not result in concrete actions being taken in response to those plans.

- Provide Participatory Analysis, Governance, and Enterprise Management training to the rural producers groups, local representatives of line ministries, and LCs, in which "landscape-based" pilot projects are being implemented.
- Advocate for legal changes that grant local groups legal standing to enter into contractual agreements with financial institutions and service providers.
- Advocate for streamlining and decentralizing the process whereby legal standing is granted.

As mentioned above, experience throughout Africa indicates that local rural producer groups that coalesce to resolve specific problems that they have identified can successfully manage the entire development process from conception to implementation (including the contracting of services for fee). Rural producer groups have quickly mastered all aspects of the planning and implementation process and often jealously guard their newly-acquired skills and prerogatives. Rural producer groups that are thus empowered become strong advocates for good governance practices at the local level and will pressure LCs to respect their engagements.

USAID can reinforce the role of LCs as local change agents by helping to improve the capacity of LCs and local representatives of technical ministries to facilitate the "landscape-based" planning and implementation process. USAID could promote an incremental (or stair step) approach to capacity building using the World Bank's LGDP checklist as a model.

In its first iteration, local groups could receive initial training in PRAs and resolve low-cost no-cost issues using local resources exclusively. Rural producer groups become especially strong advocates for good governance if their own financial resources are helping to pay for an activity.

Once smaller scale problems are resolved, local groups can receive governance training in the mechanics of the tendering process. Given the limited scope of many landscape-based pilot projects (a watershed management project might bring no more than two LCs together to manage in collaboration with rural producer groups), USAID/Kampala will need to advocate for

specific LCs to be granted the right to tender contracts on an exceptional basis. USAID/Kampala would best be served by selecting LCs recommended to it by its contractors in the field to maximize the chance of initial success.

Experience elsewhere in Africa (Niger, Senegal, Mali) points to consistent positive (and often unexpected) results when local entities (LCs and rural producer groups) are granted the right to tender contracts and to manage the entire development process from conception to fruition once they have been given rigorous training in participatory analysis and enterprise management. USAID/Kampala may choose to use its good offices to persuade the GOU to replicate these conditions on an experimental basis in selected areas. The Mission can use this approach in order to provide the GOU with successful examples of devolving decision-making responsibilities to the rural producer level.

3.4 Protected Areas

The protected areas have enormous economical potential that could provide benefits to the GOU and neighboring stakeholders. It might be in USAID/Kampala's interest to focus initial SO7 activities on promoting sustainable development activities and programs in the protected areas given the areas' high potential to produce positive revenue streams for all participants. USAID/Kampala and its partners could draw lessons from these experiences which could then be applied to the rest of the country.

The interventions available to the Mission as it seeks to promote the sustainable use of natural resources by rural producers in protected areas are the same as under the previously-described levels (Private Property/Use Rights, Private Property/Use Rights in a Highly Interdependent Context) except that greater emphasis should be given to creating and having participants master the formalized planning process.

In order to benefit from natural resources that are found within (or derived from) protected areas, rural producers (individuals or groups) will need to be granted use rights by concerned government institutions under exceptional circumstances. In order to be successful, rural producer groups will need to be able to demonstrate responsible stewardship and government institutions will need to be able to monitor the impact of rural producer activities on the protected areas. In addition, since multiple groups will be involved in managing, and benefiting from protected area resource use, all groups will need to have a common (written) understanding of how the benefits accruing from the rationale use of protected area resources will be distributed and/or re-invested.

To recast the author's second operating assumption: experience from throughout Africa has proven that rural producers are capable and are willing to become responsible stewards of communal resources such as those found in Uganda's national parks or forest reserves if an

environment is created in which it is in their interest to manage resources responsibly. However, in order for rural producers to become responsible stewards of communal natural resources processes and conditions need to be created such that:

- It is in their short-term and long-term interest to do so, and
- They are active partners in the design and implementation of all collaborative management schemes that are developed in their name.

The ODP table presented above details the usual tasks associated with the development process and assigns the level of responsibility that different stakeholder groups need to be granted in order to achieve a participatory process that leads to actual rural producer empowerment. USAID/Kampala could review all Protected Area participatory resource use plans (collaborative forest management plans; community conservation plans, the various PACs, etc.) using this matrix to determine if rural producers are actual partners in the planning process.

If there are significant differences between the ODP table and project operations, USAID/Kampala would be in the position to take steps to redress the situation. For example the Mission could:

- Continue stock-taking activities to include all of Uganda as well as neighboring countries,
- Advocate for experimental co-management pilot projects in selected protected areas,
- Support the implementation of co-managed activities using existing SO2 activities
- Advocate for a re-apportioning of revenue streams so that most, if not all, revenues remain at the point of origin, and then
- Advocate for policy and legal modifications that will promote co-management of protected area resources (including giving legal standing to CBOs) based upon the success of co-management pilot projects.

Lessons from throughout Africa⁴⁰ indicate that many successful co-management projects were obliged to engage in “extra-legal” activities in order to ensure that rural producer groups were

⁴⁰ See, for example, Camporare et al, Regional workshop on natural resource management: evolution and perspectives (2000)

allowed an active role in the projects' analysis and implementation. Donors and project personnel used their good offices to secure the *de facto* right to manage development activities. Once rural producer groups proved themselves responsible stewards and capable entrepreneurs, donors lobbied with host country governments to bring national policies in line with operational realities so that rural producer groups could obtain *de jure* rights.

The USAID/Niger-financed Agricultural Sector Development Grant II (ASDG II) used this multi-pronged strategy to great effect in Niger in the 1990's to promote the decentralization of decision-making power in the NRM sector. ASDG II personnel:

- Maintained close contact with field-level activities (both within and outside Niger) to help inform and to be informed by innovations in the field,
- Identified and supported GON Forestry Service personnel who were advocating institutional and policy change,
- Sponsored a series of workshops developed by and for Forestry Department officials to address Niger's evolving NRM sector and their role therein,
- Helped with informational campaigns to advertise policy changes that had been promulgated in the capital but that were not being implemented in the field, and
- Used conditional grants to influence the Forestry Department's decision-making processes.

This model could be used to great effect in Uganda for three reasons. First, the GOU is in the throes of fundamentally changing its role in the polity and is seeking to decentralize decision-making powers as far down its various hierarchies as possible. Second, the Anglophone common law approach to creating laws (based on precedents and practical examples) lends itself to using pilot projects more easily than does the Francophone system. Third, the Forestry Secretariat's vision for the emerging Forest Authority (and the GOU as a whole) is to create a "small, democratically elected entity with broad contracted services" which aligns nicely with the model recommended above. Finally, other activities such as the Integrated Lake Management project and the UWA's QANP Park-wide Community Institution have already begun the pioneering process.

The team's impression from speaking with GOU officials is that there is a great need to provide these officials with positive results from Ugandan co-managed activities. Officials need concrete examples of success to help them overcome their seeming intellectual schizophrenia when they state with equal conviction in the same sentence that they cannot continue to play the policeman's role yet they must protect Uganda's natural resources from rural producers' predations. One conversation with Forestry Department officials was particularly illustrative. The officials pointed out that they could not continue to police their forest reserve and that they could not continue to harvest trees because they lacked the operating funds necessary to do so.

Two suggestions, when mentioned by the author, shocked these same officials to the point that they physically recoiled. The first was to ask if the officials could not send net profits, as opposed to gross revenue, from the sale of concessions to the central authority. The second was to ask if rural producers could be brought in to co-manage the reserve on a sustainable yield basis. The fact that these conversations should be so shocking to GOU officials who are faced with the eminent demise of their forest reserve indicates that the donor community needs to play a pioneering role in promoting co-management activities in Uganda.

3.5 A Summary of Possible Interventions List Above

3.5.1 Private Property/Use Rights

- Enhance Farming Systems Research and Extension (FSR/E) capacity within NARO with support from appropriate CGIAR.
- Developing local institutions' capacity to engage rural producers in participatory analytical processes.
- Technical training for Rural Producers
- Rural producers access to capital (links to financial institutions; creation of credit unions) that is linked to rigorous enterprise management training.
- Streamline the process by which rural producer groups can achieve legal standing.

3.5.2 Private Property/Use Rights in a Highly Interdependent Context

- Support on-going "landscape based" activities such as AFRENA's Kyantobi watershed management initiative, ILM's activities, the Wetlands Programme, and pilot projects identified through the COBS-supported District Environmental Action Plan (DEAP) processes

- Provide Participatory Analysis, Governance, and Enterprise Management training to the rural producers groups, local representatives of line ministries, and LCs, in which “landscape-based” pilot projects are being implemented.
- Advocate for legal changes that grant local groups legal standing to enter into contractual agreements with financial institutions and service providers.
- Advocate for streamlining and decentralizing the process whereby legal standing is granted.

3.5.3 Protected Areas

- Continue stock-taking activities to include all of Uganda as well as neighboring countries,
- Advocate for experimental co-management pilot projects in selected protected areas,
- Support the implementation of co-managed activities using existing SO2 activities
- Advocate for a re-apportioning of revenue streams so that most, if not all, revenues remain at the point of origin, and then
- Advocate for policy and legal modifications that will promote co-management of protected area resources (including giving legal standing to CBOs) based upon the success of co-management pilot projects.

Appendix A

USAID/Kampala's interventions to promote sustainable development can be divided into promoting skills acquisition and creating the enabling environment that allows for desired actions in the following categories:

- Participatory Analysis (with particular emphasis given to the relationship between NRM and sustainable development):
 - o Analysis of current situation
 - o Identification of causes
 - o Selection of solutions
 - o Development of action plans based on current resources
- Negotiation
 - o Interest Identification
 - o Interest Aggregation
 - o Interest Articulation
 - o Interest-based bargaining
- Technical
- Governance
 - o Same as Negotiation above, and
 - o Development of action plans including development of budgets
 - o Rational and transparent letting process (for the rational allocation of resources to support planned actions)
 - o Project Management (including monitoring and evaluation)
- Enterprise Management

- o Same as Negotiation and Governance above, and
- o Identifying market niches,
- o Managing “open book” accounting systems.
- o Literacy and numeracy training where needed (focusing on women).

Appendix B

Summary Tables

SO7's overall objective is to achieve the greatest possible livelihood improvement with the greatest possible improvement in the existing natural resource base. The table below was developed to help summarize the high points of the Team's Joint Report. SO7 strategies and interventions should be tailored to respond to three distinct natural resource – rural producer ownership/use regimes which are found in Uganda.

Table 1: Private Property/Use Rights

Relationship of Rural Producer to natural resource base	Private lands
Producer-level constraints to improved management of identified resource base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RP lack precise understanding of relationship between NRM (or lack thereof) and productivity. • Few management options available to, or known by, RPs. • Limited capital available to RP wishing to adopt innovative practices <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o High cost of maintaining branch offices o Financial institutions lack confidence in RPs as credit risk o Governments insert political considerations into financial decisions • Many RP lack secure tenure • RP have limited knowledge regarding marketing products (transformation etc) • Limited infrastructure increases transportation costs and reduces profitability
Institutional constraints to improved management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimal extension services in place. • Paucity of appropriate NRM/production packages available to extension services • History of ill-advised NRM & production package recommendations from extension services and political leadership
Policy constraints to improved management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of clear policy on-on farm tree ownership • Lack of security of tree tenure security • Existing policies emphasizes other economic activities other than forestry; • There is lack of legal security which constrain land-based livelihoods, particularly when new forms of enterprises which involve partnerships with the private sector are proposed.
Primary Actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RPs • Farmer Federations • Extension services/ Research institutions • NGOs/CBOs • Private Sector service providers (input/ transformation/capital etc.)

Initial RP level of motivation to improve management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High
SO7 strategies and interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop demand-driven FSR/E NRM/production packages • Provision of capital for RPs using financial institutions and credit unions • Primary Skills enhancement focus for RPs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Participatory Analysis o Negotiation o Technical training o Enterprise anagement • Primary capacity building focus for institutions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Facilitation of Participatory Analysis o Negotiation • Primary policy focus to remove constraints <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Clarify tree tenure on private lands; o Adopt PMA's multi-sectoral approach to rural development o Streamline process whereby RP groups achieve legal standing .
Examples of success	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CLUSA • AFRENA/ • Africare/HPI • Guesselbodi • SO1 activities (IDEA)

Table 2: Private Property/Use Rights in a highly interdependent context

Relationship of Rural Producer to natural resource base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiple use areas • Watersheds • Lakes • Wetlands • Rivers
Producer-level constraints to improved management of identified resource base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of understanding re: impact of “upstream and downstream” actions upon RP’s natural resource base. • between NRM (or lack thereof) and productivity. • Few management options available to, or known by, RPs. • Limited capital available to RP wishing to adopt innovative practices <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o High cost of maintaining branch offices o Financial institutions lack confidence in RPs as credit risk o Governments insert political considerations into financial decisions • Many RP lack secure tenure • RP have limited knowledge regarding marketing products (transformation etc) • Limited infrastructure increases transportation costs and reduces profitability
Institutional constraints to improved management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No clear institutional mandate exists to assist in the addressing/ resolution of “landscape-based” NRM/productivity problems. • Few examples of successful “landscape-based” approach to solving NRM problems.
Policy constraints to improved management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflicting policies and laws for ENR; • Existing policies have no mechanisms for effective co-ordination; • Lack of clear policies and mechanisms for inter-district collaboration in the management of shared NR • Lack of means to mobilize GOU resources to address and resolve identified problems at LC1 level
Primary Actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RPs • Farmer Federations • LC1 through LC5 (based upon amplitude of problem) • Extension services/ Research institutions • NGOs/CBOs • Private Sector service providers (input/ transformation/capital etc.)
Initial RP level of motivation to improve management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moderate
SO7 strategies and interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support landscape-based activities as part of on-going SO2 activities

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary Skills enhancement focus for RPs (and RP associations): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Same as above, and o Governance • Primary capacity building focus for LCs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Same as above, and o Governance o Linking planning with implementation o Tendering processes o Project Management • Primary policy focus to remove constraints • Same as above and • Provide matching grants to districts that set aside public funds to invest in enhancing natural resources productivity • Develop demand-driven FSR/E NRM/production packages • Provision of capital for RPs using financial institutions and credit unions • Primary Skills enhancement focus for RPs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Participatory Analysis o Negotiation o Technical training o Enterprise anagement • Primary capacity building focus for institutions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Facilitation of Participatory Analysis o Negotiation • Primary policy focus to remove constraints <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Clarify tree tenure on private lands; o Adopt PMA's multi-sectoral approach to rural development • Streamline process whereby RP groups achieve legal standing
Examples of success	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AFRENA/ Africare/HPI • ILM • CPACs

Table 3: Protected Areas

Relationship of Rural Producer to natural resource base	Protected Areas
Producer-level constraints to improved management of identified resource base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PA objectives/ presence seen as threat/ impediment to RP's livelihood • Lack of understanding re: impact of "upstream and downstream" actions upon RP's natural resource base. • between NRM (or lack thereof) and productivity. • Few management options available to, or known by, RPs. • Limited capital available to RP wishing to adopt innovative practices <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o High cost of maintaining branch offices o Financial institutions lack confidence in RPs as credit risk o Governments insert political considerations into financial decisions • Many RP lack secure tenure • RP have limited knowledge regarding marketing products (transformation etc) • Limited infrastructure increases transportation costs and reduces profitability
Institutional constraints to improved management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutions charged with PA management often exclude RPs and LCs from planning process and benefit streams • GOU lacks resources to police Protected Areas • Revenue streams from PAs do not remain in local jurisdictions • Some on-going putative participatory projects are not engendering RP empowerment • No clear institutional mandate exists to assist in the addressing/ resolution of "landscape-based" NRM/productivity problems. • Few examples of successful "landscape-based" approach to solving NRM problems.
Policy constraints to improved management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of clarity in respect of rights to common pool resources contributes to inappropriate land use and management practices, and to ineffective rural governance; • Conflicting policies of central government agencies make integrated interventions untenable; • Lack of clear policy on the specific aspects of PA management have been decentralized.
Primary Actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RPs • Farmer Federations • LC1 through LC5 • PA protection institutions • NGOs/CBOs • Private sector service providers (

Initial RP level of motivation to improve management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low. • Often Contrary to PA objectives
SO7 strategies and interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue stock-taking in region • Advocate for experimental co-management schemes on pilot basis using SO2 activities as base and advisors • Advocate for re-apportioning of revenue streams to remain in local area. • Support landscape-based activities as part of on-going SO2 activities • Primary Skills enhancement focus for RPs (and RP associations): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Same as above, and o Governance • Primary capacity building focus for LCs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Same as above, and o Governance o Linking planning with implementation o Tendering processes o Project Management • Primary policy focus to remove constraints • Same as above and • Provide matching grants to districts that set aside public funds to invest in enhancing natural resources productivity • Develop demand-driven FSR/E NRM/production packages • Provision of capital for RPs using financial institutions and credit unions • Primary Skills enhancement focus for RPs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Participatory Analysis o Negotiation o Technical training o Enterprise anagement • Primary capacity building focus for institutions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Facilitation of Participatory Analysis o Negotiation • Primary policy focus to remove constraints <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Clarify tree tenure on private lands; o Adopt PMA's multi-sectoral approach to rural development <p>Streamline process whereby RP groups achieve legal standing</p>
Examples of success	